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GAS TRADE AND DEMAND IN NORTHWEST EUROPE:
• REGULATION, BARGAINING AND COMPETITION.
By
Olav Bjerkholt, Eystein Gjelsvik and Øystein Olsen
• ABSTRACT
The paper investigates the present role of the gas transmission companies and possible
effects of a deregulation of the European gas market by 1992, i.e. the introduction of the
principle of common carriage or open access to the European transmission system. In a
price/netback analysis, effects of a non profit pricing policy in transmission is compared with
prevailing pricing policy. These calculations reveal that, at least in some countries, transmiss-
ion companies have exploited monopoly power, and thus restricted gas consumption.
Common carriage may be defined as "third parties" being allowed to carry gas through the
existing networks paying current average transmission costs. Simulations on a gas demand
model for Western Europe indicate that this kind of pricing policy will increase gas
consumption of gas significantly in major consuming countries. Finally, supply responses
initiated by common carriage are studied by simulating a dynamic oligopoly model for the
European gas market. The simulations confirm that the potential for natural gas is far from
exploited, and that consumers will benefit from the introduction of common carriage.
Not to be quoted without permission from author(s). Comments welcome.
1. INTRODUCTION. 
"Natural gas is likely to remain
an underexploited fuel from the
strict perspective of economic
efficiency." M.A.Adelman & al. (1986)
Over a period of twenty years natural gas has become one of the major sources of energy
supply for European households, business and utilities. The overall share of natural gas in
the energy use in Europe has increased from somewhat above 3 percent in 1966 to just over
15 percent in 1986. Whether this expansion should be considered fast or slow is a
contested issue. According to critical observers such as e.g. Ode11(1988) and Adelman et
al.(1986) the expansion has been far too slow  as a combined result of unrealistic pricing
policies of the producing companies, monopolistic practices in the transmission and distribu-
tion, misperception of the natural gas supply situation in Europe and various institutional
constraints.
For the future role of natural gas in the energy supply of Western Europe the immediate
years to come may be of particularly great importance for the role of gas far into the next
century. The big issue is deregulation, but it is not the only matter of importance.
On the supply side there is a bargaining battle coming up between the three contenders
Algeria, Norway and USSR about the replacement of Dutch export and descending
indigenous gas reserves. On the demand side, there may be more countries hooked onto
the main transmission grid in Europe and there will be more customers connected to the
distribution network in the major gas consuming countries.
The increased awareness of environmental risks may become a factor which will work
strongly in favour of natural gas which is cleaner than its closest substitutes fuel oil and coal.
Natural gas may also replace nuclear power for environmental reasons, accentuated by the
Chernobyl disaster. The technological development in cogeneration etc. may also work to
promote natural gas as the preferred choice on economic as well as environmental grounds.
The deregulation issue has emerged with two major references: the deregulation of natural
gas markets in North America and the intention of the Commission of the European
Community to remove all obstacles to free trade within the Community by 1992. The
possibility of deregulation has caused some consternation in the transmission and distribution
companies. At the present time, there is more bewilderness than anything else about what
the consequences of the Community's intention will be for the natural gas markets. For the
supplying nations outside EC deregulation of gas markets may have great economic
importance and influence the producing companies ability to capture the various kinds of
rents inherent in gas markets.
In the following we shall first take a brief look at the current state of the European natural
gas market and the preveailing market structure (section 2). We shall then discuss the
"common carrier principle" starting from elementary economic theory (section 3) and then
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consider the outlook for the next decade as it has been projected by different observers
(section 4). In the ensuing section (section 5), we will look at the existing market structure
from an angle of price/netback analyses of market segments, thereby shedding light on the
current price discrimination of end users. By carrying out model simulations, we then aim at
calculating the effects on European gas trade of a non-discriminating price policy. Section 6
takes this analysis further by applying a game theoretic model to the battle over future
market shares between the three big suppliers: Algeria, Norway and the USSR. Section 7
concludes.
2 THE EUROPEAN GAS MARKET.
"..the mere five-point increase in gas'
percentage contribution to the energy
market over the past decade and a half
represents a failure by the gas industry
and government energy policy makers to
accept the opportunities offered by
natural gas for changing Western Europe's
energy system.'; P.Odell (1988)
The discoveries of significant indigenous gas reserves, first in the Netherlands and other
continental countries and later on in the North Sea, along with large supplies made available
by USSR and Algeria, have enabled a gradual evolution in gas consumption in Western
Europe. Due to high, but declining average costs of transportation, natural gas penetrated
first to electricity generating utilities and large energy intensive industrial plants. However,
as the gas distribution network was expanded, natural gas accelerated as a primary fuel
chosen by households and in smaller industries and the commercial sector as well. In some
countries (e.g. Italy and United Kingdom), the local distribution could make use of existing
town gas networks.
In this section we will first survey briefly the evolution of natural gas in the European
market. Then we turn to a discription of some important features, technological and
institutional, of the present market structure.
2.1 The evolution of a European natural gas market. 
The evolution of natural gas demand in Europe is shown in table 2.1. During the 1970s, gas
demand increased rapidly in the major countries specified in the table. In the aftermath of
the two oil price hikes, energy consumption in the European countries has stagnated or
decreased in the 1980s. Natural gas, however, has continued to penetrate in the energy
market, although at a lower pace than in the preceding decade. The share of gas in total
energy demand thus rose from about 14.3 percent in 1979 to 15.2 percent in 1986. The
growth in gas consumption remained strong in Italy and United Kingdom, wheras demand
leveled out in Germany and France. Some smaller countries added to total gas demand.
TABLE 2.1: NATURAL GAS CONS
I
UMPTION ,WESTERN EUROPE : Million Tonnes Oil Equivalent
Average growth
	
1965 	 1970 	 1975 	 1980 	 1986 	 1980-86,
Austria 	 1.6 	 2.5 	 3.6 	 4.2 	 4.4 	 0.8
Belgium & Luxembourg 	 0.1 	 3.5 	 8.3 	 9.1 	 6.7 	 -5.0
Denmark 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 1.0
Finland 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.7 	 0.8 	 1.0 	 3.8
France 	 5.0 	 8.4 	 17.1 	 21.9 	 24.8 	 2.1
Greece 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.1
Iceland 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.0
Republic of Ireland 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.5 	 1.1 	 14.0
Italy 	 7.3 	 10.8 	 18.6 	 23.1 	 28.9 	 3.8
Netherlands 	 1.6 	 15.7 	 32.0 	 31.0 	 33.1 	 1.1
Norway 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.0
Portugal 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.0
Spain 	 0.0' 	 0.1 	 1.3 	 1.8 	 2.5 	 5.6
Sweden 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.2
Switzerland 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.5 	 0.8 	 0.9 	 2.0
Turkey 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.3
United Kingdom 	 0.8 	 10.4 	 32.1 	 41.1 	 48.3 	 2.7
West Germany 	 2.5 	 12.8 	 35.0 	 43.3 	 41.8 	 -0.6
TOTAL WESTERN EUROPE 	 18.9 	 64.1 	 149.2 	 177.6 	 195.1 	 1.6
of which
Elects. generation 	 11.5 	 32.5 	 25.1 	 24.1 	 -0.7
Industry 	 31.4 	 59.4 	 68.2 	 63.5 	 -1.2
	
Residential, commercial 	 28.2 	 55.1 	 79.6 	 99.2 	 3.7
AS SHARE OF PRIMARY
ENERGY CONSUMPTION (%)
	
2.3 	 6.7 	 13.2 	 14.5 	 15.2
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, OECD Energy Balances
In recent years, natural gas has had greatest success in the residential and commercial sector
(see table 2.1). In 1986, gas consumption in the sectors constituted close to 50 percent of
total demand in Europe, while this share was only about 37 percent in 1975. Ease of control
and high efficiency, in particular in central heating systems, have motivated households to
switch to natural gas, both through conversion and retrofit investments. Even more
important, however, has been the tendency of installing gas in new dwellings. In several
countries, the share of gas heated dwellings among new homes has come to exceed 50
percent, and was in the range of 70-80 percent in the United Kingdom in the mid-1980s.
During the last ten years, the gas distribution network has been expanded to new areas. As
indicated by table 2.2, the shares of households living in gas areas have become rather high
in many countries, considerably exceeding the fractions of households actually using gas. Still,
significant numbers of potential customers are not covered by local gas grids.
In the manufacturing sector, gas consumption has stagnated in the 1980s (see table 2.1). The
industrial share of total gas demand has declined from 37 to 32 percent from 1980 to 1986.
This has been due both to a generally low activity level in this period, energy conservation
and changes in the industrial structure, as part of the energy intensive industry has moved
from Europe to other regions of the world. In additon, while natural gas has been promoted
in the residential sector, a common view is that this has not been the case for industrial use.
On the contrary, pricing policies in several countries have in periods been directed to
encourage the continued use of domestically produced coal.
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Source: Le Marche Domestique du Gas.
Colloque International de Marketing Gazier.
A similar observation can be made for the power industry, where consumption of gas has
been reduced significantly in absolute terms. On the one hand, energy policies, both pricing
policies and R&D efforts, have supported and served to conserve a structure consisting of
coal fueled power plants. In additon, some countries, like France and the United Kingdom,
have extensive nuclear energy programs. In the latter countries, gas sales to power stations
are almost negligible, while the shares of natural gas in the total primary energy
consumption in utilitites' in the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy are 11 and 19
percent respectively. Most likely, there will be forces working for a continued increase of
the use of coal in the sector. However, the Chernobyl incident may imply that the -future
implementation of nuclear power programs are postponed in countries like Italy and
Germany. Combined with a growing environmental concern this may open for more
extensive use of natural gas.
Turning then to the supply side, table 23 presents estimates of total gas reserves and
production of the most important suppliers to the European market. Within the group of
consuming countries, some have significant domestic gas resources of their own, but with the
Netherlands as the only net exporter. Furthermore, it may be noticed that the R/P ratios of
these countries are rather low. Three main producing areas are supplying the region from
the outside, namely Soviet Union, Norway and Algeria. Soviet Union , has close to 40 percent
of the total reserves of natural gas in the world. It is the dominant supplier of gas to other
centrally planned economies, and has also become the largest exporter of gas to Western
Europe. With its huge reserves, there should be a considerable potential for further increase
in exports to the Western countries. Algeria's  exports consists partly of piped gas to Italy,
and partly of LNG deliveries to several countries at the continent. Its resource base is large.
Norway's offshore production of natural gas increased rapidly in the 1970s and all its
production (close to 30 bcm in 1987) is exported to UK and the European continent
through pipelines. The present R/P ratio is estimated to more than 100 years; Norway's
weight in the total European gas supply may thus increase further in the future. An
important event for Norway's supply position was the ratification of the Troll agreement in
1986. The deliveries from this large gas field and the accompanying Sleipner field will secure
the deliveries to Europe in a period (from 1995 onwards) when production from other
fields, both indigenous and in the North Sea, are leveling out.
TABLE 2.3: NATURAL GAS RESERVES AND PR ODUCTION, 1986
	Production, Proved reserves,	 R/P 	 Net exports
bcm 	 1000 bcm 	 ratio 	 to W. Europe
France 	 3.60 	 0.04 	 11.11 	 -19.93
Italy 	 12.93 	 0.30 	 23.20 	 -16.42
Netherlands 	 57.03 	 1.80 	 31.56 	 23.90
Norway 	 27.30 	 3.00 	 109.89 	 27.30
United Kingdom 	 38.27 	 0.60 	 15.68 	 -10.04
West Germany 	 11.29 	 0.20 	 17.71 	 -30.53
Others 	 4.60 	 0.26 	 56.52 	 -21.80
TOTAL WESTERN EUROPE, 	 155.02 	 6.20 	 39.99 	 -47.52
ALGERIA 	 42.10 	 3.00 	 71.26 	 24.60
USSR 	 733.80 	 41.10 	 56.01 	 38.80
Source: Bp Review of World Gas, OECD Energy Balances
Thus, after about 25 years of evolution, the supply situation for the European natural gas
market seems more abundant than ever. The consuming countries are connected to four
large supply regions: Groningen in the Netherlands, the Algerian Sahara, Uringuoy and
Tyumen Ublast in Western Siberia and the North Sea. The gas reserves included in these
fields represent potentials for many years with total consumption at a considerably higher
level than what materializes today. Moreover, most of the major countries in Europe are
interconnected in a central transmission system. On this background, the convential view
among analysts is that, if anything, it will be the demand side that will restrict the further
penetration of gas in the European market. In tu rn, this is partially dependent upon the
strategies pursued by the transmission and distribution companies, i.e. their efforts to expand
local distribution networks and to market gas to new consumers.
2.2 A brief overview of the prevailing market structure
Natural gas is supplied by a number of producing companies having property rights to
onshore or subsea resources consisting of a limited amount of natural gas. This makes
natural gas an exhaustible resource which means that the cost of production includes, in
addition to the factor cost of bringing it to the wellhead, an opportunity cost of reducing
the amount that can be produced in the future. This opportunity cost is the rationale of a
resource rent to be included in the marginal cost. Another important feature is that
increased production over existing capacities will typically be made available by large scale
investments in development of new fields. There is thus lumpiness on the supply side. As
will be discussed in section 6, these technological features may have significant effects on
market behaviour.
Gas at the wellhead is still far from the end user. The transportation of natural gas in
Europe is undertaken by pipelines, first from wellheads to import terminals, then through
national transmission grids and, finally, via local distribution networks to the final end users.















low high 	 low high 	 low high
	
low high 	 low high
	
tow high 	 low high
Production 	 1.00 	 1.00 	 1.08 	 3.14 	 0.81
Transport2) 	 0.50 0.64 0.55 0.85 	 0.66
Distribution
-domestic 	 2.92 4.00 2.92 4.00 2.92
-large scale 	 0.58 0.87 0.58 0.87 0.58
Total unit cost
-domestic 	 4.42 5.64 4.55 7.99 4.39
-large scale 	 2.08 2.51 	 2.22 4.86 2.05
CIF unit cost 	 1.50 	 1.64 	 1.63 	 3.99 	 1.47
1.73 	 0.42 	 0.61 	 0.05 	 0.28 	 0.05 	 0.28 	 0.01 	 0.31
1.36 	 1.03 	 2.65 	 1.46 	 1.84 	 1.96 	 2.73 	 0.12 	 0.18
4.00 2.92 4.00 2.92 4.00 2.92 4.00 2.92 4.00
0.87 0.58 0.87 0.58 0.87 0.58 0.87 0.58 0.87
7.09 4.37 7.26 4.43 	 6.13 4.93 	 7:01 	 3.05 4.49
3.96 	 2.03 	 4.13 	 2.09 3.00 	 2.59 3.88 	 0.71 	 1.36
3.09 	 1.45 	 3.26 	 1.51 	 2.13 	 2.01 	 3.01 	 0.13 	 0.49
Notes: 1) Sources Adelman and Lynch (1986), Dahl and Gjetsvik (1988), Messner and Strubegger (1986)
2) Transport costs to a central point of the European gas market.
The cost components of natural gas thus consist of extraction (production), transportation
from wellhead to import terminals, national transmission and local distribution / . In table 2.4,
cost estimates for a number of natural gas fields serving Europe are reported. The cost
estimates vary over a large range, probably due to different assumptions on uncertain
parameters such as investment costs, depletion rates/production capacities, reserve estimates
etc. Distribution and transmsission costs are the dominating cost components 2. For the
inexpensive and close to market Groningen field, distribution costs exceed 90% of the total.
For the "high cost" Troll field, extraction constitutes around 20%, internatinal transport
around 15%, and distribution the residual 65% of total costs. Even for LNG-exports, where
costs of liquifying, shipment and regasification are more than double of average international
pipe transportation costs, and for gas shipped from the permafrost area Urengoi in Siberia,
distribution costs exceed 50%.
The transmission lines and local distribution networks have the same lumpiness and
indivisibility properties as the production capacity. A transmission and distribution network
to serve a given set of end users will for this reason often have spare capacity. Increased
demand may thus imply lower, rather than higher, average transportation costs per unit.
Investments in new transport capacity to cater for even higher demand may also imply lower
average unit costs as better use may be done of the already existing infrastructure.
A sketch of the market structure of a region is given in figure 2.1. The suppliers are
indigenous producers and exporters. The transmission company is the retail link, contracting
the producers and selling it to end users and local dist ribution companies. Households,
service- and other smaller industrial customers are linked to the local networks. Large end
users, electric utilities and energy intensive industries, buy gas directly from the retail
The distribution cost figures presented in table 2.4 include
local distribution, storage facilities to handle peak load
demand and national transmission costs.
2It is assumed that small scale consumers pay transmission and

















The dominant role of the major transmission companies give them a key role in the market.
Economies of scale in transportation of natural gas imply that typically there will be a
limited number of distribution companies serving each market. Moreover, the transmission of
gas from wellheads or import terminals to local distribution companies is by and large
undertaken by transmission companies of which there are only few altogether and each of
which is a virtual monopoly in its region. In some countries, like the Netherlands and
Belgium, there is one company controlling the national gas transmission network. In
Germany there are 8 regions with 8 different transmission companies. The largest, Ruhrgas,
has shares in three of the others, and more important, it controls the national transmission
network. This makes Ruhrgas a dominant firm in Germany. In all other countries there is
one dominant firm. With the exception of recently privatized British Gas, they are national,
partly state owned monopolies. (For a more detailed overview, see Bundgaard-Sørensen and
Hopper (1988))
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3. AN OPEN, INTEGRATED AND SINGLE EUROPEAN GAS MARKET? 
A repeated issue in recent discussions of the European gas market is the need for major
structural changes in institutions and contractual arrangements. The discussion has been
spurred by recent developments in the North American gas market and also by confronting
the current market structure with the trade principles of the European Community (EC).
The latter aspect has been emphasized, in particular, with reference to the intention of the
EC Commission to remove all trade obstacles and bring the the open market into full effect
by 1992. Applications of these principles to the natural gas markets have been referred to as
"open access", "common carriage" or the "common carrier principle".
Critical observers of the European market have for many years argued that the prevailing
market structure and market arrangements allow for exorbitant rents both to producers and
to transmission companies, and that the high end user price that follows has severely limited
the expansion of the market and resulted in underutilization of transmission capacity. A
recent statment by a long time critic is Odell (1988) who blames the "club" of companies led
by people of "limited horizons.: "Thus in the Western European gas market today there is
the double irony of under-exploited supply potential and an underdeveloped market. The
misconceptions over gas supply and gas markets are, moreover, not simply allowed to persist
by the powerful club of gas transmission and distribution companies/institutions (some state
and some private). They are deliberately encouraged by them...Their management principal
objective ...appears to be to find guaranteed long term supplies just adequate to meet their
predetermined calculations of markets which have been chosen in such a way that they do
not have to worry much at all about competition from alternative energy sources. The
strategy overall reflects a 'satisficing' approach by management which is anxious to be seen
doing a technically excellent job, but which has no stomach to accept the challenges and to
respond to the opportunities of a competitive approach to Western Europe."
The discussions of reform centered on the common carrier principle 3 have received strong
and articulate opposition from the "club" members. Ruhrgas board member B. Bergmann
(Bergmann (1988)) \argues that "the current healthy state of the European gas markets is
due to careful long term planning and financing by national gas monopolies and large
integrated companies, and that enforced common carriage would wreck havoc with gas
company planning." Another statement from a similar source says that "the present system
and gas supply in Europe is sufficient and that any move to modify the present strucuture
by introducing throughout Europe a blanket obligation on gas companies to transmit gas for
third parties would undermine security of supply, cause uncertainties in the market, and be
detrimental to the interests of the end users."
The vehement reaction of the transmission companies towards a change in the rules of the
game in the direction of common carriage is embedded in a set of arguments of why the
North American development cannot be applied to Europe. It is argued that the common
carrier principle is incompatible with the current reliance on take-or-pay import contracts
3Yhere may be a distinction between "common carriage" and "open
access" - the first implying the obligation to carry a
shipment of gas, while the latter is the weaker obligation to
carry the gas in the case of idle capacity on a first come
first serve basis. In this paper we use the two expressions
synonymously for the weaker obligation.
and that a change in existing contracts cannot be enforced because in Europe there is no
authority corresponding to the Federal Energy Regulatory Com mission able to exert
regulatory powers over all parties. Furthermore, it is argued both that common carriage
would endanger the energy supply security of Weste rn Europe and that common carriage
would leave small distribution companies as easy victims of take -overs and thus result in
strengthened monopoly/monopsony power rather than the opposite.
As stressed above, the transmission companies are in a strong position vis-a-vis the
producing companies and control almost completely the access to end users. The producing
companies can at most try to make the most out of dealing with more than one transmission
company. The end users on the other hand are facing a monopoly in almost all regions. The
transmission companies are thus monopolists and oligopsonists as they seem to work well
together and share common views in policy matters. They are also tied together to some
extent through joint ownership. On the other hand most of them have been organized on a
public utility basis with government participation or working within the limits of government
concessions. Thus, they may not exploit their monopoly position to the limit.
The position of the EC Commission as to what the common carriage
means and how it should be implemented for the gas market is by no means clear. Various
documents by the European Commission describe and discuss the problemes concerned,
which may be outlined as follows
- harmonization of taxes and prices and the obligation to publish distribution tariffs and
prices of individual contracts (price transparency)
- open access to the national and international pipeline systems, ie. the obligation to
allow the gas suppliers to carry any volume of gas to a "third party" (end user). This
principle of common carriage means the end of a system of national monopoly for gas
transmission companies as retailers of gas.
- abolition of prevailing obstacles to free competition between different fuels for
electricity generation. Important is the banning of gas burning and protection of nuclear
and domestic coal in some markéts.
The European Community has not come out with an official position in these matters yet,
but several documents indicate that EC officials lean in favour of open access and other
measures to promote competition in European energy markets. While efficiency
considerations and the general principles of the European Community clearly favour reform
of the prevailing market structure, it is still difficult to guess the final outcome of the
political handling of this problem within the EC. The political authoritites of the EC has
not shown a strong interest in promoting competitive energy markets until recently. The EC
Council has i.a. prohibited any further use of natural gas in government owned power
plants. Underlying this regulation, which clearly has to go if gas markets are to become
more competitive, is the protection of domestic energy sources in the respective EC
countries: coal in the United Kingdomn and the Federal Republic of Germany and nuclear
power i France and Belgium. Another argument used by the transmission companies which
may or may not impress the EC politicians, is - in B. Bergmann's words - that it would be
foolish to "weaken the position of West European gas companies in their negotiations with
suppliers outside the European Community". This is, of course, nothing but a protectionist
argument.
Consumers, independent producers and regulators have common interests in looking for
policy means to enforce more efficient ways of trading and transporting natural gas within
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Europe.
For Statoil and other large producers it seems clear that they do not have the same interest
in holding onto the take-or-pay contracts as the transmission companies. The lower prices
since 1986 have created greater interest in raising additional revenue by finding outlets for
supplementary gas resources, maybe to the extent of trading the apparent security of the
take-or-pay contracts against the possibilities of direct contracting with end users and local
distribution companies opened up by the common carrier principle. High cost producers with
fields that would not have been developed under more competitive conditions, stand to lose
in a more competitive market, however. Statoil's position is clearly vulnerable from a cost
point of view, especially if the Glasnost thaws away any political limit set on Soviet supplies.
Statoil's control over the entire Norwegian production and transportation to the Continent
and the United Kingdom gives the company considerable flexibility in its marketing. In a
recent statement on the development of the European gas market, the common carrier
principle etc, the head of Statoil, Mr. H. Norvik, voices his concern "that the outcome of
these deliberations in the Community will be based on a deep understanding of how the gas
markets function in Western Europe and take account of the need for a market  structure,
which supports the ability to undertake the long term investments particular to the gas
industry".
In the further discussion we shall first have a look at the common carrier principle within a
simple static framework.
Static equilibrium theory applied to the European gas market
In a competitive market of an "ordinary" good the equilibrium price is defined by the
intersection of a downward sloping demand curve representing the aggregate marginal utility
schedule of many small consumers and an upward sloping supply curve representing the
aggregate marginal cost of production schedule of many small producers. The equilibrium
price is thus equal to marginal cost. The total net benefit accruing from the consumption of
the good is split between "consumers' surplus" falling to the consumers and the "profit" of
intramarginal producers. In a long term equilibrium intramarginal profit is eliminated by
competition and the market equilibrium is depicted by the wellknown textbook figure 3.1
showing the intersection of the demand curve (D), the marginal cost curve (MC) and the
average cost curve (AC). By the fundamental theorem of welfare theory the competitive
equilibrium is necessary and sufficient for efficient allocation of resources in the absence of
externalities (in a wide sense), but only if all other markets are in similar equilibrium. We
take these textbook commonplaces as our starting point in discussing the peculiarities of gas
production and trade in Western Europe.
The European gas market differs in almost every respect from the textbook paradigm except
that also in the gas market there are a large number of small consumers. Let us point out
the differences of greatest importance for our discussion with reference to the overview of
the gas market given in section 2. As mentioned there, due to resource scarcity in the
supply of natural gas different producers will have differing marginal costs, not only as a
transient phenomenon to be eliminated by competition, but as a permanent feature.
Intramarginal profit will thus not be eliminated by competition. Second, increased production
over existing production capacities will typically be made available by large scale investments
in development of new fields. And third, the number of producers is relatively small, which
raises the question of imperfect competition. i.e. the producers ability to capture more than
their fair share - as defined by perfect competition - of the total value of the gas produced.
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Q uan t ity  
The transportation and retailing of natural gas are again very different from the
corresponding services of "ordinary" goods, for which these aspects usually are left out of the
analysis of market equilibrium, as being rather inessential. Technologically, we have the
textbook case of a "natural monopoly", i.e. downward sloping average cost curves in the
distribution of natural gas. Increasing returns may be caused by underutilization of capacity
because of indivisibility, by lumpiness of investments as new projects are large relative to the
size of the market, or by other technological reasons. The increasing returns in distribution
could even outweigh decreasing returns in production. The presence of increasing returns to
scale is obviously of major importance for the present state of the market. The end users
are in practice constrained to purchasing from only one company, have no possibility of
storing the commodity, and have thus no way of counteracting price discrimination between
end users.
The specific features of the gas market lead to various kind of r ents. We have already
mentioned the resource rent accruing from the exhaustible nature of gas resources. The
small number of agents producing and trading gas together with the elements of increasing
returns may lead to monopoly rent. (If increasing returns prevail, one may have monopoly
rent with zero profit.) Finally, the lack of arbitrage possibilities for end users allow rent
from price discrimination, which in principle
could amount to . capturing the entire consumers' surplus.
We shall illustrate the solution in the gas market with and without regulations in a static
stylized setting, with competitive conditions in production, but with a transmission monopoly.
In figure 3.2, the MC-curve represents total marginal cost and the MPC-curve marginal
production cost. Marginal transmission cost (MTC) is hence represented by the difference
between the two curves. MPC is everywhere increasing. Where MC is less steep than
MPC there are increasing returns in transmission. The curve AC is the sum of MPC and the
average cost of transmission. The vertical distance between AC and MPC diminish, which
means increasing returns to scale in transmission of gas. The demand curve is D, while







that the transmission company buy gas at competitive conditions from producers. The
optimal sales volume from an overall efficiency point of view is at the intersection of the
marginal cost curve and the demand curve.
A transmission monopoly free to discriminate between end users (discriminating monopoly)
will in theory generate exactly this solution. The tariff structure can be designed to capture
the entire consumers' surplus (gas should be offered to consumers at declining tariffs
corresponding exactly to their willingness to pay). The tariff will charge each end user the
same optimal marginal rate. This holds whether the monopoly owns the gas it transports or
not. This hypothetical situation is depicted in figure 3.2, yielding the equilibrium quantity x c.
Since the efficiency volume is realized, there is thus a certain rationale in an unconstrained
transmission monopoly. The marginal price paid by the consumers is p c, while the average
price is higher. Compared to the competitive equilibrium, the consumer surplus '(the shaded
area) is transferred to the transmission companies.
In practice, a transmission monopoly will not be able to apply a perfect discrimination of
end users. It will rely on flat rates, at least for larger market segments, and take its profit
from monopolistic rates and restricted volumes rather than perfect discrimination. The other
extreme is thus no discrimination, but monopolistic tariffs. This situation, which is that of a
textbook monopoly, is also depicted in figure 3.2. The monopoly solution has price p m and
sales volume xM. In a fully exploited monopoly situation as drawn here, the average cost of
transmission is smaller than the transmission companies' margin, which means a positive
monopoly rent.




The common carrier principle can be taken to mean access to the use of the transmission
pipeline at current average costs, i.e. the costs corresponding to the volume xM in figure 3.2.
Producers and end-users would then have a margin of mutually beneficial trades. Market
forces could then be relied on to bring the end-user price down until it equals AC. This
new situation is depicted in figure 3.3, where the "common carrier" equilibrium is given by
price pcc and sales volume xcc. This is still a higher price and lower volume than the
(unobtainable) competitive equilibrium given by price pc and volume xc. The main point is,
however, that the move from pm to pCe reduces transmission cost. The transmission
companies' surplus vanishes, and the transport tariff is reduced to average transmission costs.
Based on this stylized theoretical framework we conclude that common carriage may lead to
higher volumes traded and more competitive behaviour in the gas market (See also the
discussion in Hurst (1988)). There are, however, other ways of regulating the transmission
monopoly. One is by forcing the transmission monopoly to set its rates on a traditional
public utility cost-of-service basis. This will result in pipeline tariffs set at average costs and
theoretically lead to the same result as common carriage. Another way is by direct regulation
of end user prices towards the same equilibrium solution. The latter alternative combined
with common carriage may be the right remedy to speed up adjustment in a transient phase
of an underdeveloped market. Increasing oil prices as might result from the recent OPEC
accord might help in this respect.




What then about the claim that common carriage will simply transfer monopoly power and
benefits from the transmission companies to producers of natural gas? Clearly, one cannot
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disregard the possibility that producing companies will take advantage of the new situation
and try to capture a part of the consumers' surplus by price discrimination. However, as
pointed out in section 2 there are several potential suppliers to the European market, each
having significant reserves, and in an open market there are thus reasons to expect strong
competition over market shares. We will return to this in section 6.
In the arguments of the transmission companies of defending the present intstitutional
settings, there seems to be a stubborn resistance towards accepting what is perhaps the most
important lesson from the market reforms in United States, namely that the "natural
monopoly" of gas transmission companies does not prevent competition provided that open
access to the pipeline system is enforced. Typically, occurrences of considerable increasing
returns to scale are indications of "immaturity". A downward sloping cost curve will by
increasing demand sooner or later flatten out. The distribution of natural gas in Europe is,
therefore, in our view still in an immature stage and largestimated er gas volumes traded
and transported will bring the average unit costs down.
It should also be mentioned here that the United Kingdom has already enforced the
common carrier principle. This was introduced in the Oil and Enterprise Act of 1982 and
later extended in the Gas Act of 1986. The United Kingdom is a special case, however, both
because it is a separate subsystem of gas supply as long as there are no pipelines across the
Channel and because of the privatization of the British Gas Corporation. The common
carriage is a part of the regulation of the privatized BGC, as are also various transparency
regulations on the public access to contractual prices and tariffs.
Existing take-or-pay contracts may, of course, prove less profitable for producers as well, as
a consequence of "third parties" entering the market with new deliveries. In particular,
contracted gas from high-cost fields may suffer from the fact that they have been developed
too early.
4 THE OUTLOOK FOR THE EUROPEAN NATURAL GAS MARKET.
"The horizon for natural gas in
Western Europe is not, at the
present time, overshadowed by
clouds.", B. Bergmann (1988)
What is the potential for future gas demand in Western Europe? We shall answer this by
surveying a selection of recent projections for natural gas demand. Here, we have built upon
the rather detailed overview of scenarios reported in Estrada et al (1988), and in addition
we have looked more closely into the forecasts made by the Inte rnational Energy Agency
(IEA (1988)) and Purvin & Gertz (1987). The main emphasis will be on the evolution in
existing major markets for natural gas. The main reason for this is that in section 6 the
projections will be compared with simulations on an econometric model which, naturally, is
calibrated on the existing market st ructure.
Some of the basic assumptions underlying the projections surveyed, supplemented with our
own interpretations of implicit policy related issues, are briefly discussed below.
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4.1 General conditions and assumptions. 
(i) Limited scope for demand growth.
While the supply situation for Europe is rather abundant, there are some indications that
the penetration of gas in the market is restricted by institutional barriers and the presence
of a certain degree of monopoly power in the gas industry, and in particular in the national
transmission companies. In the following, we assume that the projections surveyed share this
consensus view; i.e. they take the present institutional settings of the gas market as given.
This in turn may be important in explaining why the projections point to rather limited
growth in gas demand. A critical discussion of the projections will be carried out in section
6.
(ii) The transmission and distribution system.
In coherence with the arguments under (i), the projections do not foresee any strong
expansion of the distribution system for natural gas. With rather low population and energy
densities in new potential markets and high costs in building new pipelines, a further
expansion of the network may seem too costly to transmission companies under present
institutional conditions.
(iii) Irreversible energy savings.
A common view among energy analysts is that after the oil price shocks in the 1970s,
"energy projections will never again be the same" (Bergmann (1988)). In other words: even
though prices have returned to a lower level, it is highly unlikely that we once again will
experience growth rates in energy demand as we did in the sixties and seventies. The reason
is partly that a large part of the energy savings that have occurred in the last decade is
irreversible (see e.g. Schipper and Ketoff (1985)) and partly that however low energy prices
fall, the expectations about future prices will be different from pre 1973. Low energy prices
may thus prevent substitution away from energy to continue at the same rate, but old energy
intensive technologies will not return to the arena.
(iv) Economic growth and energy structure.
Projections of energy demand in Europe are typically based on assumptions of moderate
economic growth, say in the range of 1.5 - 2.5 percent per year. Moreover, in all countries
total energy demand is assumed to increase more slowly (0.5 - 1.5 percent per year). Energy
conservation is thus believed to lie around 1 percent on average in the projection period, in
spite of the lower energy prices. An important explanatory factor for a projected decline in
energy intensities is a continued trend of reduced weight for energy intensive industries in
Western Europe.
(v) Prices and energy competition.
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The degree and form of competition between natural gas and other fuels varies from sector
to sector, and also to some extent, from country to country. In the residential sector, the
traditional competitive fuel is fuel oil, with electricity playing an increasingly important role .
as a substitute fuel in some countries, such as France. In the industrial sector, LSFO (low
sulfur oil) is the main substitute fuel, while in electricity generating, oil (HSFO or LSFO)
and coal still dominate as heating fuels.
IEA's latest projections are based on the following scenario for the crude oil price: after a
couple of years with prices below 20 US$/barrel, crude prices start to rise again from
1989/90 and reach a level of around 25 US$ in 2000. On average, this coincides roughly
with the underlying assumptions of Purvin & Gertz. Due to differences in tax system and
the overall energy policy, some differences between countries and . sectors are expected. For
most countries, it is foreseen that prices on heavy fuel oil to industry and power generation
will increase relatively more than prices on gas oil to the residential sector.
The price path for c= is generally assumed to be favourable, i.e. show minor growth
compared to prices on other energy carriers. The background for this picture is that
domestic energy policies are likely to continue to promote the use of European coal
reserves, both in industry and in power generation. However, regarding the future of coal, a
big question mark is how environmental aspects will affect energy demand.
Electricity prices , are assumed to show considerable variations between the various countries.
France can safely be placed in one corner; with its strong nuclear programs and coal
dominating among fossil fuels, electricity prices are expected to be kept low and outcompete
other energy sources. Thus, Purvin & Gertz assumes constant real  prices throughout the
simulation period (until 2010). In other countries such as Italy, the Netherlands and
Belgium, prices are assumed to reamin high and largely prevent electricity to penetrate into
new applications and end uses.
(vi) Some sector specific features:
According to most demand projections, in the residential sector several factors are
favourable for experiencing further growth in gas consumption. First, during the last decade
the local distribution network has been expanded to cover new consumer groups of
households. The shares of households living in "gas areas" according to table 2.2 significantly
exceed the corresponding shares of dwellings actually applying gas for heating and other end
uses. Accordingly, there should be scope for aditional "hookups" to the gas grid. However,
the definition of availibility as measured by the figures in table 2.2 may lead to
overestimation of the potential of new customers. To be located in a "gas area" simply
means that there is piped gas available somewhere in the neighbourhood. To have an actual
gas outlet in a dwelling may require additional investments by the local distribution company,
in addition to the hookup costs paid by the individual household.
Second, in existing markets for gas forecasters generally foresee a prolonged strong position
for gas as the primary fuel choice both in new dwellings and when old fuel systems are
replaced. In recent years, gas has been installed in one out of two new dwellings in United
Kingdom, Germany and Italy. Based on simulations on a formal model for space heating
Bartlett, Olsen and Strom (1988) estimate the isolated effect of new dwelling fuel choices on
the 1985-2000 growth in gas demand to 22 percent. Also, according to Bergmann (1988),
the total number of gas heated dwellings in Western Europe may increase by 15 million to
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55 milion at the turn of the century.
Third, there is a general trend in the direction of increased share of central heating in the
dwelling stock in many countries (see Bartlett et al, op. cit). In such systems, natural gas is
convenient due to ease of control and no need for storage facilities in the individual
dwelling.
In the industrial sector, the demand horizon for gas is in the direction of moderate growth,
matching the projected increase in total energy use in the sector. According to Purvin &
Gertz, most of the increase in industrial demand stems from increased need for gas for
steam raising, while only minor changes are expected for the inputs of gas for direct heat
and feedstock.
Traditionally, large energy intensive industries have typically bought firm gas directly from
the transmission companies. From the industry's point of view, long term contracts of
delivery may be advantageous since large investments usually are involved. For the
transmission company, contracted gas deliveries were similarly necessary for them to engage
in the construction of infrastructure and pipelines. After the market segment for natural gas
has been broadened to include smaller industrial consumers, interruptible contracts have
become more common. A high fraction of the latter type of deliveries, combined with
flexible energy technologies probably stimulates demand in an environment where there is a
slight price advantage for gas in the market.
In the electricity generating sector, in addition to environmental issues, the future of the
nuclear industry constitutes a major uncertainty. As mentioned above, the nuclear programs
in France are assumed to be almost unaffected by the Chernobyl accident. In some of the
other countries, e.g Germany and Italy it is more likely that there will be at least restrictions
on the further expansion of nuclear power stations. This may create new possiblities for
natural gas as a fuel in this sector. On the other hand, in both these countries gas meets
severe competition from coal, and especially in Italy the long term prospects for gas as
feedstock in power generation are believed to be rather poor.
4.2 Demand projections for Western Europe. 
Table 4.1 presents ranges of estimates for the future demand for natural gas in the major
consuming countries in Western Europe, distinguishing also between different market
segments. For these countries taken together, gas consumption in 1986 amounted to 178
mtoe. This constituted close to 19 percent of primary energy consumption in this group of
countries, and covered more than 94 percent of total gas demand in Western Europe this
year.
It is seen that a combination of the most pessimistic scenarios implies that total gas
consumption will decrease and remain flat at a level of 166-167 mtoe, which may be
compared to the estimated consumption of 178 mtoe in 1986. Along the upper path of the
projection ranges consumption ends at 222 mtoe (2010), which represents an average yearly
growth of 0.9 percent. Even this may be characterized as rather moderate compared to the
historical evolution of the European gas market, as presented in section 2. The increase in
total gas consumption is on average assessed to be somewhat stronger until 2000, and the
following flattening in demand may be interpreted as reflecting a saturation of the market.
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As mentioned above, according to the majority of the scenarios, there is still a significant
potential for growth in the residential sector in Europe. The bulk of estimates for this
market segment is thus rather close to the upper limit of 122 mtoe in Table 4.1, meaning an
annual increase in consumption of about 1 percent. In particular, the strong expansion of
the pipeline system in countries such as the FRG and Italy involves possibilities for further
penetration of gas. In the more saturated residential markets in the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom, the development is more likely to be characterized by slower growth. In
the latter country, a decrease in the energy intensity in new homes due to better insulation
standards may counteract a continued increased market share for gas in the dwelling stock.
The projections for the industrial sector are in general evaluated as more uncertain. The
future growth in gas demand is highly dependent on overall economic conditions, such as
the development in aggregate production, its composition between different sectors and
energy subsitution. Thus, if one should trace a path for expected future industrial gas
demand, this would probably be more in the center of the presented interval compared to
the picture for the residential sector. On the other hand, the figures in table 4.2 clearly
demonstrates the possibility, as seen by some forecasters, of renewed growth in the industrial
market in the range of 2 percent per year. A driving force underlying such an optimistic
development is likely to be a strong substitution away from fuel oil in the manufacturing
sector. The prospects for increased growth in these industries seem most promising in the
FRG.
TABLE 4.1 European gas demand*), 1986-2010. Mtoe.
1986 	 1990 	 2000 	 2010
GERMANY 	 39.2 41.5 - 45.7 	 40.6 - 50.4 	 43.1 - 56.5
Residential/comm. 	 19.2 20.3 - 22.0 	 19.7 - 24.4 	 23.3 - 28.5
Industry 	 14.3 	 17.2 - 19.0 	 16.4 - 21.0 	 16.4 - 23.0
Power gen. 	 5.7 	 4.0 - 4.7 	 4.5 - 5.0 	 3.4 - 5.0
FRANCE 	 24.8 24.8 - 26.9 	 25.5 - 31.5 	 25.9 - 34.7
Residential/corm. 	 13.4 	 14.0 - 14.5 	 14.7 - 17.3 	 15.1 - 19.2
Industry 	 11.0 	 10.8 - 11.9 	 10.8 - 13.7 	 10.8 - 15.0
Power gen. 	 0.4 	 0.0 - 0.5 	 0.0 - 0.5 	 0.0 - 0.5
UNITED KINGDOM 	 43.1 	 40.2 - 45.9 	 38.8 - 50.8 	 39.2 - 53.8
Residential/come. 	 30.8 28.4 - 31.0 	 27.2 - 33.5 	 28.0 - 35.3
Industry 	 11.8 	 11.6 - 14.0 	 11.6 - 15.7 	 11.2 - 16.9
Power gen. 	 0.5 	 0.2 - 0.9 	 0.0 - 1.6 	 0.0 - 1.6
ITALY 	 28.4 	 29.3 - 35.2 	 31.1 - 38.1 	 29.4 - 36.1
Residential/corm. 	 12.5 	 13.4 - 15.2 	 15.1 - 17.2 	 15.9 - 18.2
Industry 	 10.4 	 11.6 - 12.0 	 12.1 - 13.9 	 12.5 - 15.4
Power gen. 	 5.5 	 4.3 - 8.0 	 3.9 - 7.0 	 1.0 . 2.5
NETHERLANDS 	 32.5 	 23.8 - 33.5 	 22.5 - 30.6 	 22.8 - 30.7
Residential/come. 	 15.8 	 12.1 - 15.5 	 11.6 - 14.7 	 11.2 - 14.8
Industry 	 8.0 	 6.9 - 9.4 	 6.9 - 10.3 	 6.9 - 10.7
Power gen. 	 8.7 	 4.8 - 8.6 	 4.0 - 5.6 	 3.7 - 5.2
BELGIUM/LUX 	 6.7 	 6.8 - 8.2 	 7.9 - 9.6 	 7.3 	 10.1
Residential/comm. 	 3.9 	 3.9 - 4.7 	 4.7 - 5.8 	 4.3 - 6.1
Industry 	 2.5 	 2.6 - 3.1 	 3.2 - 3.5 	 3.0 - 3.7
Power gen. 	 0.3 	 0.3 - 0.4 	 0.0 - 0.3 	 0.0 - 0.3
TOTAL GAS DEMAND,
MAJOR MARKETS 	 174.7 166.4 - 195.4 166.4 - 211.0 167.7 - 221.0
Residential 	 95.6 	 92.1 - 102.9 93.0 - 112.9 	 97.8 • 122.0
Industry 	 58.1 	 60.7 - 69.4 	 61.0 - 78.1 	 60.8 - 84.3
Power gen. 	 21.1 	 13.6 - 23.1 	 12.4 - 20.0 	 8.1 - 15.1
*) Eksclusive own losses and statistical differences.
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The most striking trend in the gas market according to the reported projections, is the
decline in the use of gas in electricity production. The only "disagreement" is the strength
and speed of this reduction. As mentioned above, this expected downward path for gas use
is a result of planned restructuring of the electricity industry in many countries. In Italy
there are official programs for reducing oil import. This may give natural gas a push, also
for increased use in power generating. However, in the 1990s, most forecasts expect a
marked decline in the gas share in this sector, and improved positions for coal and nuclear
energy. A similar scenario may be drawn for the Netherlands. However, as stated already,
worries regarding security problems in nuclear plants and environmental issues, create great
uncertainty regarding the future development for natural gas in the power sector.
4.3 New markets for natural gas? 
Even though natural gas has penetrated the European market rapidly since the late 1960s,
there are still several countries which either do not consume gas at all or where the market
share of gas is relatively small. In addition to the countries included in our discussion above,
the most significant gas users in Western Europe  in 1986 were Austria and Spain4, with
total consumption figures of 4.4 mtoe and 2.7 mtoe respectively. In particular for the latter
country, many analysts expect a significant growth in demand. This will partly come through
increased LNG imports from Algeria, and partly through new pipeline systems connecting
the national distribution system to the Western European grid via France. It should also be
noted
that Spain already has established some of the necessary local distribution of natural gas, as
many cities have been served with manufactured gas for several years. In Austria, the further
expansion of natural gas is expected to be restricted by competition from other fuels,
especially electricity.
Another interesting question is whether new markets , for natural gas will develope in the
future. Some claim that, especially with the presently low price environment, one may doubt
whether anybody will find it beneficial to take the high costs of stretching pipelines to new
markets (Bergmann (1988)). On the other hand, it is generally accepted that if gas got a
foothold in a new market of some size, due to the econonmies of scale in transportation,
there will be significant potential for future growth. In the south of Europe, Turkey may be
such a case, where a new pipeline system is under construction to enable imports from
Soviet Union. Recent estimates for gas demand in Turkey in MOO is in the range of 3.9 -
6.5 mtoe per. year (Estrada et al (1988)).
In the Northern part of Europe, there has been a heavy debate in recent years on the
possibility of developing a Scandinavian market for natural gas. Some consumption already
exist in Denmark, Sweden and Finland (3 mtoe in total). There are basically two issues that
form the background for the recent discussion on an expanded gas market. One is the
presence of huge Norwegian reserves of natural gas at the continental shelf, some of which
has no other practical application than being used domestically or exported to Sweden or
Denmark. The other important event actuating gas in the Scandinavian energy markets is
4 If we include Yugoslavia to the Western hemispher, this
should also be added to the list of significant users.
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the Swedish decision that the country's twelve nuclear plants are to be phased out within
2010. This development may even be accentuated by the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.
The general view is thus that Sweden is a key country when discussing the future potential
for gas in this region. Most likely, the Swedish electricity generating sector will need
significant volumes of imported gas when we are approaching 2000. Natural gas is by the
authorities pointed out as a favourable, and relatively "clean" alte rnative fuel. The
distribution company Swedegas expects a level of consumption above 2 mtoe per year in the
second half of 1990s, increasing further to somewhere in the range of 4 - 6 mtoe when the
distribution system has been fully expanded.
Depending partly on the development in Sweden, one may also see further penetration of
natural gas in Finland (with present consumption at 1.4 mtoe, and with expressed interest in
having the Swedes sharing the costs of new transmission lines from Soviet Union) and in
Norway, where gas utilities have been proposed as a supplement to the existing large
capacity of hydro-power. Some large Norwegian manaufacturing industries have also
expressed their interest in using gas as feedstock, while due to the extensive "electrification"
of the economy, the prospects for gas penetrating in the residential market are rather poor.
Altogether, 1 - 2 mtoe has been suggested as a reasonable estimate of gas consumption in
Norway.
Denmark has easy access both to the continental gas grid and to deliveries from the North
Sea. For this country as well, the best prospects for expanded gas use is in the power
generating sector. Some deliveries (1.5 - 2 mtoe) to this sector are already contracted for
the early 1990s. As for the other Scandinavian countries, both in the industrial sector and in
households gas will meet strong competition from electricity. However, an interesting issue
in the energy market in Denmark, as well in Sweden, is the penetration of district heating
systems, especially in new dwelling areas (estimated to take 35 and 30 percent respectively
of the new homes market in 1984). This development may represent an additional
opportunity for natural gas as a primary heating source in the residential sector of these
countries.
5. A PRICE/NETBACK ANALYSIS OF MARKET SEGMENTS, AND THE EFFECTS OF
NON-DISCRIMINATING PRICING. 
As mentioned in section 3, gas transmission companies may be regarded as natural
monopolies. The majority of the companies are controlled by the governments, and even
those that are privately owned, operate under government concessions. The behaviour of
gas transmission companies may be that of a non-discriminating monopoly, discriminating
monopoly, non-discriminating public utility or a mixture of the three. In this section we
attempt to throw some light on the profitmaking behaviour of the transmission companies by
presenting figures on prices paid by different consumers and costs and profit margins in the
transportation of natural gas. To the extent the analysis reveal a positive netback to
distribution companies and/or price discrimination, it is an indication of the use of
monopoly power.
The netback analysis is carried out for the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the
United Kingdom. For each of these countries, we distinguish between three market
segments: households/commercial, industry on firm supply contracts and industry on
interruptible contracts. Eurostat (1988) provides data on gas price for end users of different
yearly offtakes in the first two sectors. For households, we have chosen a weighted price
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corresponding to a 125.6 GJ per year consumption level. For firm industries, the price for
an offtake at 418600 GJ per year is used. For interruptible industrial deliveries, the price of
heavy fuel oil is used in the calculations.
The cost figures are collected from Purvin & Gertz (1987). There, the following cost
components are specified and estimated:
i) Town distribution (assumed zero for industry)
ü) National transmission, including storage costs
iii) Import price (cif)
iv) Value added tax on the components above (assumed zero for industry)
Subtracting the components i)-iv) from the end user price, gives the corresponding net profit
margin or netback to the transmission company. Estimates of distribution costs and netbacks
for two years, 1984 and 1987, are reported in table 5.1. These estmates are in the middle of
the range reported in table 2.4. In the same table, we present calculated "unit cost prices"
for each user group, defined equal to the estimated total unit costs of delivering gas.




End user price (4) 	 12.36
VAT 	 1.52
Town distribution (2) 	 2.34
National transmission (2) 0.84
Import price (cif) 	 5.12
Netback 	 2.54

















1984 	 1987 avg(80-87)
9.10 	 5.87 	 8.43
0.00 	 0.00 	 0.00
0.00 	 0.00	 0.00
0.84 	 0.84 	 0.84
5.12 	 2.44	 4.47
3.14 	 2.60	 3.12










Premium factor (1) 	 1.05 	 1.41 	 1.13 1.23 	 1.95 1.45 	 1.00 	 1.00
End user price (4) 	 12.74
VAT 	 2.00
Town distribution (2) 	 2.33
National transmission (2) 0.87
Import price (cif) 	 5.33
Netback 	 2.21
















6.53 	 3.86 	 6.11 	 7.75 	 2.86
	
0.00 	 0.00 	 0.00 	 0.00 	 0.00
	
0.00 	 0.00 	 0.00 	 0.00 	 0.00
	
0.87 	 0.87 	 0.87 	 0.87 	 0.87
	
5.33	 2.18 	 4.23 	 5.33 	 2.18
	
0.33 	 0.81 	 1.01 	 1.55 	 -0.19
	
6.20 	 3.05 	 5.10 	 6.20 	 3.05
Premium factor (1) 	 0.90 	 1.09 	 0.92 0.84 	 1.35 1. 07 	 1.00 	 1.00
UNITED KINGDOM
End user price (4) 	 7.20
VAT 	 0.00
Town distribution (2) 	 2.43
National transmission (2) 0.90
Import price (cif) 	 4.04
Netback 	 -0.17
















5.46 	 5.12 	 5.41 	 6.28 	 3.05
	
0.00 	 0.00 	 0.00 	 0.00 	 0.00
	
0.00 	 0.00 	 0.00 	 0.00 	 0.00
	
0.90 	 0.90 	 0.90 	 0.90 	 0.90
	
4.04 	 2.92 	 3.59 	 4.04 	 2.92
	
0.51 	 1.30 	 0.93 	 1.33 	 -0.77
	
4.94 	 3.82 	 4.49 	 4.94 	 3.82
Premium factor (1) 	 0.72 	 1.19 	 0.86 0.87 	 1.68 1.26 	 1.00 	 1.00
Notes: (1) Ratio of gas price to alternative price, here LFO in household and HFO in industy sector. (2) Source:
Purvin & Gertz (1987). (3) Total unit cost = import price + town distr. + national distr. + VAT (4) Source: Eurostat
(1988)
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The table shows quite significant netback margins and price differentials. In the FRG, the
highest netbacks are calculated for firm industrial deliveries, while margins for interruptible
contracts are rather small. The margins generally decreased from 1984 to 1987. End user gas
prices declined less over these years than fuel oil (premium factors increased). Thus, in spite
of the squeeze in margins, gas lost competitiveness against fuel oil, especially heavy fuel oil,
but closed the gap to coal prices. - In the United Kingdom, netback margins in households
and smaller industries were negative in 1984, but turned positive in 1987 after the import
price plummet. The pricing policy tends to be slightly in disfavour of large industrial users,
but also industry netbacks were much lower than in Germany. The calculated figures for the
United Kingdom indicate that British Gas kept low prices and let a part of the gas rent be
passed on to the consumers before 1987. The decrease in gas prices in 1986/87 has been
relatively less. -- As opposed to the other two countries, in France the estimated netbacks
are highest for the group consisting of households, commercial and other smaller industries.
Based on these figures, Gas de France seems to have had a pricing policy that has favoured
larger industries. The margins are at roughly the same levels both in 1984 and in 1987.
To sum up, price differentials between firm industry supplies and other users have been
large in France and the United Kingdom, but insignificant in Germany. The German pricing
policy seems to have been that of a non-discriminating monopoly squeezing all consumers at
the same level, the French policy has discriminated against households and other smaller
users, while the British policy has favoured and partly subsidized smaller consumers, probably
at the expence of indigenous gas producers.
Interruptible gas cannot be easily compared with firm gas for two reasons. First, interuptible
gas can be used to improve capacity utilization of the network, as supplies can be reduced
in peak periods and increased in off peak periods ("peak-shaving"). Thus, the average cost of
interruptible gas is somewhat lower than indicated in table 5.1. Second, demand for
interruptible gas is almost perfectly elastic around HFO prices and inelastic otherwise.
Accordingly, from a welfare point of view, the price should not deviate much from HFO
pricés, which, however, may differ from the price of firm gas deliveries. The optimal supply
of interruptible gas on the horizontal part of the demand curve will be decided by the
excess capacity in the transmission network.
Obviously, various uncertainties are inherent in the estimated distribution costs. Since import
prices are assumed to represent the cost of gas to the transmission companies - if gas can
be bought cheaper from indigenous producers, the margins will be underestimated. This may
e.g. affect the estimates for the United Kingdom, where British Gas in periods has set
indigenous prices below import prices on gas from Norway. Furthermore, a large fraction of
the transmission and distribution costs are fixed capital costs. As a result, the unit costs
presented in table 5.1 vary with several economic and geographical factors in the various
countries and market segments.
How can the calculated profit margins and the actual volumes of natural gas brought to the
market place be evaluated in light of the theoretical discussion in section 3? Let us again
abstract from most of the problems mentioned above, and concentrate on the stylized, static
setting for gas distribution discussed in section 3. Recall again figure 3.3. The average cost
in transmission in the current situation generally decreases with the volume of gas
transported through the pipeline. If we ignore the possibility of having a perfectly
discriminating monopoly (yielding the first-best situation xc), the observed equilibrium point,
for which distribution costs are calculated, is somewhere to the left of the quantity xcc,
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which yields a zero netback in transmission. Thus, based on the calculated costs and
margins a main conclusion is that the volumes of gas in the markets are too small, i.e.
smaller than what should have been attainable under more competive market conditions. To
evaluate the degree of distortion in the market simply on this kind of information is,
however, not possible. To do this in a satisfactory way would have required full information
of the various cost and demand functions. That we do not have. In particular, we do not
know how close the present market situation is to the point x M, i.e. where the gas
distribution company utilizes its full monopoly power.
What we instead intend to do in the following is to estimate the demand effects of gas
prices being reduced from the actual levels to prices corresponding to the calculated total
unit costs in table 5.1. If the gas companies reduced prices to this level, gas demand would
increase, but still be lower than xcc. So, even though ATC decreases, the distribution
companies would still earn a positive margin s.
To measure volume effects we have used a gas demand model for the European market
developed in the Central Bureau of Statistics, called GEM6. This model covers all the major
gas consuming countries in Western Europe, distinguishing in each between four sectors:
households, commercial, industry and power generation. GEM has been simulated for two
sets of prices: (1) average 1980-1987 end user prices, and (2) Unit cost prices, as presented
in table 5.1. In simulation (1), we have used the same prices in the household and
commercial sector, while firm industry prices are applied in the manufacturing sector. Other
variables have been kept constant at 1984 level. Gas consumption in the power generation
sector have been kept constant throughout the analysis. The model has been run over
several years in order to include lag effects and compute long term equilibrium solutions.
The results of these simulations are reported in table 5.2.
According to these calculations, total gas consumption in the FRG (exclusive power
generation) would increase by 8 mtoe if gas prices are decreased to unit costs. The gain is
largest in the household sector, almost 4,5 mtoe, while demand in the industry sector
increases with 2,5 mtoe. - In the United Kingdom, the volume effects are rather
insignificant, due to the small differences in actual prices and unit costs reported above. - In
Shore precisely, we do not simulate what we believe would be
the full effect of open access. Imagine we start out from a
point on the DD-curve (fig 3.3) somewhere between XM and Xcc -
Assume the price is reduced to the corresponding unit cost
level at the AC-curve. We simulate the movement to the
corresponding point on the DD-curve at that price level.
6 The estimation of this modelenerall produced rather highg 	 Y p 	 g
income elasticities and low price elasticities. This is a very
common pattern in econometric demand analysis of the European
gas market, and may be explained largely by the fact that gas
use has increased rapidly in the observation period, while
there have been moderat changes in income and prices.
Moreover, elasticities for the industrial sector are obtained
from data on firm gas contracts, as data for interruptible
deliveries have not been available. This will also tend to
underestimate price elasticities for the industry sector as a
whole.
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France, the total gain of more competitive pricing is 3.5 mtoe, half of which is estimated to
take place in the household sector.
It should be emphasized that the losses and gains of table 5.2 are differences in long term
equilibrium levels, which will only occur if the price differences are sustained over a long
period of time. As stressed above, our constant average cost of transmission and distribution
in these caculations tend to overestimate unit cost prices at the new volumes and thus
underestimate volume effects. On the other hand, there is, of course, uncertainty related to
the estimated cost figures.
Still, the model runs support the argument that current price policies of the gas companies
have significantly restricted consumption in countries like Germany and France. The
simulations indicate that demand in the three sectors households, commercials and industry
in these countries could increase by 10 - 23 percent if more competitive pricing policies
were adopted. Lifting the ban on the use of gas for power generation would add significant-
ly to this prospect. Actually, several analysts foresee the best potential for gas in the latter
market segment if gas were allowed to compete (Odell (1988), Rogner (1988)). Thus, the
current 15 percent market share of gas in Europe's energy market seems far too low.




Households Commercial Industry 	 Total.
	
1 Historical prices 80-87 7.0 	 9.6 	 8.8 	 25.7
2 Unit-cost prices 	 8.7 	 10.5 	 9.6 	 29.1
Deviation (2-1) 	 1.7 	 1.0 	 0.8 	 3.5
	
% 24.3 	 10.4 	 9.1 	 13.6
WEST-GERMANY Households Commercial IØtry 	 Total
	1 Historical prices 80-87 10.1 	 7.6 	 13.8 	 42.0
	2 Unit-cost prices	 - 	 14.5 	 9.0 	 16.2 	 50.3
	Deviation (2-1) 	 4.5 	 1.4 	 2.4 	 8.3
	
% 44.5 	 18.4 	 17.4 	 19.8
Both the comparisons between prices and costs and the model runs indicate that gas
companies do not maximize consumer surplus, but rather exploit a monopoly position to
capture a positive rent. However, it is also clear that the analysis is based on some rather
simplifying assumptions. One complication is caused by the fact that there are a limited
number of agents on the supply side as well. A realistic description of the gas market should
therefore take into consideration the game situation over contracts between large producers
like the Netherlands, Norway, Algeria and Soviet on one side and the national gas
companies of Western Europe on the other side. The outcome of negotiations may be some
kind of sharing of the total rent, arising by deducting real producer and distribution costs
from end user prices.
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TABLE 5.3 PRODUCER RENTS FOR SELECTED FIELDS, 1987USS/mill. BTU
Norway 	 , Soviet 	 Algeria 	 Netherl
Ekofisk Statfjord Heimdal Sleipner Troll Urengoi New,W-Sib Pipe 	 LNG Groningen
Unit cost 	 1.64 	 2.38 	 3.34 	 • 3.20 	 3.09 	 3.26 	 3.61 	 2.13 	 3.01 	 0.49
Producer rent
	1980	 1.81 	 1.07 	 0.11 	 0.25 	 0.35 	 0.19 	 -0.16 	 1.32 	 0 .44 	 2.96
	 1	 2.93 	 2.19 	 1.23 	 1.37 	 1.47 	 1.31 	 0.96 	 2.44 	 1.56 	 4.08
	1982	 3.68 	 2.94 	 1.97 	 2.12 	 2.22 	 2.06 	 1.70 	 3.19 	 2.30 	 4.82
	 3	 3.32 	 2.59 	 1.62 	 1.77 	 1.87 	 1.71 	 1.35 	 2.84 	 1.95 	 4.47
	1984	 3.66 	 2.92 	 1.96 	 2.10 	 2.20 	 2.04 	 1.69 	 3.17 	 2.29 	 4.81
	 5	 4.59 	 3.85 	 2.88 	 3.03 	 3.13 	 2.97 	 2.61 	 4.10 	 3.21 	 5.74
	1986	 3.07 	 2.34 	 1.37 	 1.52 	 1.62 	 1.46 	 1.10 	 2.59 	 1.70 	 4.22
	 7	 0.97 	 0.23 	 -0.73 	 -0.59 	 -0.48 	 -0.65 	 -1.00 	 0.48 	-0.40 	2.12
	Average	 3.00 	 2.26 	 1.30 	 1.45 	 1.55 	 1.38 	 1.03 	 2.51 	 1.63 	 4.15
Table 5.3 presents figures that might shed some light on producer rents. The table reports
costs of gas (cif.) to a central point in Western Europe for some of the fields exporting to
Western Euro e^. Producer rents are calculated by subtracting these cost figures from(cif.)p	 Y	 g	  
import prices. The figures show that up to 1986, all producers had a positive margin. The
data thus indicate that the gas contracts are designed to share rents between producers and
gas companies.8 In 1987, import prices had come down below the break even level for some
of the most important exporting fields like Norwegian Heimdal, Algerian LNG and long
distance Soviet gas. This stresses the point that when oil prices are very low, long term gas
contracts cannot protect producers' investments in high cost fields against losses. With the
lower price environment in 1987, the estimated rents should be interpreted as differential
property rents, rather than resource or monopoly rents. Due to decreasing returns in gas
extraction, property rents would occur even in a perfectly competitive market.
6. SIMULATION OF FUTURE GAS SUPPLIES AND PRICES IN A DEREGULATED EC
MARKET 
Our investigation so far does not support the "healthy" diagnosis given by Dr. Bergmann.
End user prices have not (1987) come down to competitive levels and there are strong
indications that the gas markets of Western Europe are under-utilized. But the argument
7The cost figures correspond to the upper end of the range
presented in table 2.4. We believe this is clorer to the
historical costs due to low capacity utilisation.
8 Hoel, Holtsmark and Vislie (1987) model a cooperative game
between sellers and buyers in the gas market. Gas companies
are assumed to maximize consumer's surpluse. The solution of
the game (the core) identifies a price belt bounding the
contract prices. The solution allows for rents both to
consumers and at least some of the producers.
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that the prevailing market structure with long term "take or pay" commitments are necessary
to ensure gas supplies in the long term, are still to be investigated. Will common carriage
undermine the market, get rid of "take or pay" contracts and scare off investors from high
cost gas projects like Troll? Or, will it be foolish of the EC to undermine the strong
positions of the gas companies, leaving the battlefield open for strong and greedy producer
groups ready to form a cartel?
6.1. A Brief Description of a Dynamic Oligopoly Model
To answer these questions we have made simulations on a dynamic oligopoly model (DOM)
developed in the Central Bureau of Statistics, Norway. The model describes a game between
three large producers: Norway, Algeria and Soviet, playing on an excess demand function
(total demand of the Western European Continent minus indigenous production). This
model simulates a deregulated market in which there is no intermediate barrier between
suppliers and end users, and the producers compete directly for market shares.
The United Kingdom is kept out of the game, and the Dutch production is included in
indigenous supply. Since the game is essentially an investment game between suppliers with
a bundle of lumpy investments, and the Netherlands already have made most of their heavy
investments, this seems a reasonable way to reduce number of players which makes the
model easier to handle.
Each player possesses a bundle of large, lumpy investments. In the beginning of each 5-
year period they can make one or more investments, or none. The moves are done
simultaneously, only previous investments are known. The investments are operative in the
next period.
The players maximize discounted cash flows over the horizon of 17 5-year periods
starting in 1985. They have perfect information of demand, costs and projects and can
predict the other players' best moves. The players choose their best actions on the basis of
this prediction (Nash equilibrium).
A model solution consists of a complete plan of how to act in all future periods. The plans
(strategies) consist of a set of actions, conditioned on previous outcomes. Thus, the solution
also shows the alternative optimal actions whenever another player deviates from the
optimal action by, say, postponing an investment. This property will be utilized in the model
runs.
The model is solved by dynamic programming, and the solutions are perfect Nash equilibria9.
The solutions of this investment game are dependent on the solution of the short run game
for given investments l0. Also, price and quantity supplied for given capacities are dependent
on the specification of the short run behaviour. For the sake of simplicity we have chosen
the Bertrand price game (Bertr and (1883)). This implies full capacity utilization and lower
prices compared to a short run Cournot game.
9In some cases the Nash solution is not unique, i.e there are
two or more Nash equilibria. Rationality in such situations is
not easy to define. We assume the minimax solution will be
chosen in this case.
10The solution of the short run game have no impact on the
state variables of the investment game
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The supply behaviour assumed by DOM is strikingly different from that of a static Cournot
(investment) game. In Mathiesen et al (1986) a Cournot model of the European gas market
is specified, based on long term marginal cost curves and demand curves in year 2000. In
such a model, the deviations from competitive equilibrium are dependent on the curvature
of LTMC curves and demand curves, and the number of players. The model allows the
producers to hold back on supplies because end user prices exceed marginal cost of supply
according to the familiar Côurnot equilibrium.
The Cournot investment game is played once and for all, i.e. the players cannot respond to
each other's actions or moves. The Cournot equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by the collusive
solution (monopoly) which, however, is not achievable when producers cannot cooperate.
This is known as The Prisoners Dilemma.
But if the game is repeated, and the players have so-called trigger strategies, the collusive
solution may be an equilibrium (Friedman (1983)). In this repeated game solution, if a
player breaks out, this will be observed by the other players, and one or more of the others
will play high supply for a number of periods, teaching the villain a lesson. As opposed to a
one period static game, in a dynamic setting this strategy is perfectly rational, even if the
players punish themselves in the short run.
However, we will argue that as a description of behaviour in the market for natural gas,
the collusive repeated game solution is not appropriate. The main reason is that the
existence of irreversible investments give little power to trigger strategies. If Norway has
developed Troll, Soviet can punish Norway by making big investments, but this will not be
rational from the Soviet point of view because Norway's investment is permanent and
irreversible".
To grasp the basic implications of the existence of large and irreversible investment projects
in the gas market, a model building explicitly on dynamic game theory is required. In such a
game the players are perfectly aware of that their current actions has important implications
in future periods. If Norway decides on a large investment in period 0, this will not only
increase total supply and decrease market prices, but also decrease profits on the
competitors' future investments. In such a dynamic game, the states and the strategies at
various points in time will depend on previous actions and outcomes in the market. In
equilibrium, the players will balance the profits from discouraging other supplies by making
an investment, against the profits from restricting supply by postponing the investment. This
point may be illustrated by the following paragraph.
6.2 A Dynamic test identifying strategic investments
In a perfectly competitive market, where suppliers are price takers, investments are not
justified before price exceeds average costs (break even price). In DOM, it may be optimal
to implement investments before this point in time, if this restricts other agents' investments
sufficiently to increase profits later on. We will refer to this type of investments as strategic
investments. This means that the price path can deviate both from a perfectly competitive
path and the price trajectory implied by a simple Cournot game, being lower in periods of
1 1 Since variable costs are a minor share of total cost, it
will normally not be rational to close down fields or pipes
temporarily.
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strategic investments and higher later.
A comparison of the dynamic game solutions calculated by DOM and the simple Cournot
solutions for the investment game can be undertaken in the following way: At the beginning
of each period a player can invest or not, and using the Cournot assumption that the other
players will not change their actions, she will invest if the net profit from the investment
exceeds zero, i.e. if12
NPI = [Pi°irPo'lo ' (CidIrcoIo)](l +r) 1 - rI > 0
Prices p and quantities q and variable unit costs c with subscript 1 refers to the investment
being carried out, while the subscript 0 denotes that the investment is postponed. The term
in the square bracket is the net income from investing. Discounting this one period and
subtracting interest payments on the investment rI yields the net profit of initiating the
investment in the present period. If NPI is negative, the investment must be strategic, i.e the
player would not have invested if she were a Cournot player, it is the effect on others
players' investments later on that motivates the investment. This is indicated in the tables in
the appendix with a minus sign.
6.3. The base case
i) Demand assumptions
The price- and income elasticities are averaged over those used in the GEM model
referred to in previous sections. The aggregate demand function gives a lower demand in
1990 and 1995 than the TEA and Purvin & Gertz projections for the same income and price
assumptions, but a slightly higher demand in 2000 and 2010 13. Indigenous production was
123.2 bcm in the base year 1985, and is assumed to decrease by 1.2% throughout the
horizon.
ii) Initial production and excess capacities
In 1985, exports to the demand region was 13, 17.8 and 28.6 bcm for Norway, Algeria
and Soviet respectively. Norway had initially no excess production capacity. Exports are
assumed to increase to 15 bcm in 1990, but decrease later on as fields expire. Algeria had
idle capacity of 4.7 bcm in the Transmed pipeline to Italy in 1985. We assume this capacity
to be fully utilized by 1990. Similarly, the 27.4 bcm idle capacity in the Soviet export
pipeline to Europe is assumed to be absorbed by 1990.
iii) Investments
Each player has three possible projects. For Norway these are Sleipner (5 bcm) and
Troll I and II with 24 bcm each. Algeria can install a compressor platform in Transmed,
adding 5.5 bcm to total capacity. The second project is building another pipeline across the
Mediterranean Sea, adding another 18 bcm to total export capacity. The third possibility is
12 More precisely, we assume that the other players will not
change their investment paths. This is the open loop solution
of the game as opposed to the closed loop solutions in the DOM
model.
13 
The model has been run for a more accurate calibration to
Purvin & Gertz (1987)'s implicit demand function. This did not
change the DOM-solution
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utilizing and restoring "idle" LNG capacity, amounting to 20 bcm. Soviet can install extra
compressors increasing existing pipeline capacity by 12 bcm. The other options are two new
pipelines to Western Europe with 30 bcm capacity each.
The estimated cumulated investment costs are (in mill USS)
Projects 	 1 	 2 	 3
Norway 	 1900 	 8400 	 14400
Algeria ' 	 400 	 6700 	 7700
Soviet 	 200 	 9200 	 18200
iv) Variable costs and discount rate.
In the DOM model, variable costs are the sum of variable production costs like labour,
material, insurance and energy costs, and transport costs to a central point in the European
market. For producers not investing in pipelines, transport costs are total average unit costs
including capital costs. This applies to all three Norwegian projects, which are all field
investments.
The first two of the Algerian projects increase the share of pipeline gas. This will imply
lower variable unit costs for two reasons. First, the new investments include a share of total
capital costs of transporting the gas to central point in Europe. Second, the share of LNG
with high variable unit costs of liquefying, sea transport and regasification, is decreasing. The
third Algerian project increases the LNG share and thus increase variable unit cost.
All Soviet projects are pipeline projects and thus transport tariffs paid exclude incremental
capital costs. If we assume Soviet gas transported through existing pipelines pay total cost
tariffs, increased investments imply decreasing variable unit costs. The size of the tariff
should in any case depend on whether there is idle capacity or not in the pipeline. In a long
run equilibrium, the tariff should balance against total marginal costs. In the DOM model,
we have chosen a simplified way of assessing variable costs. These are actually set constant,
equal to what will be the estimated variable costs after all potential investment projects have
been carried through. This cost level is about the average Norwegian transport costs.
The base case discount rate is set at 10%.
6.4 Results from the DOM simlations. 
The base case results are shown in the Appendix. In 1985, the players optimal decision
is project 0, 1, and 1 for Norway (N), Algeria (A), and Soviet (S) respectively. This means
that Norway does not invest in this period, while Algeria and Soviet starts both compressor
projects. These capacities are added to 1985 supplies and excess capacities, increasing total
import from the three suppliers to 111 bcm in 1990. The price will plummet to 60% of 1985
level at 2.34 1985$/mill BTU (93.6 $/1000 cm3) as a result of this massive flow of gas
pouring into the market. Still, the cif-price level is above the observed 1987-level. All suppli-
ers have positive operating profit, but the Algerian is down to 18 $/1000 cm. At this price,
some of the costs for existing fields are below break even level. Algerian LNG sales does
not cover variable costs, and would be shut down if the model allowed the existing sales to
be shut down.
Norway decides to start the Sleipner investment in 1990, the Troll I investment in 1995, and
Troll II in 2010. Algeria initiates the pipeline investment in 1990, and the LNG investment
as the last investment simply at the point of time (2045) when this action maximizes
discounted cash flow. Soviet puts in the first new pipeline project in 2015 and the second in
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2035. As a result of these investments, the price does not exceed 1985 level until 2025. In
2050 all investments are productive, the game is over and the price increase at the speed set
by the excess demand function.
Due to our assumption regarding the short run (Bertrand) game, all existing capacities in
the production and transmission system is absorbed immidiately. However, the most striking
result from the base run is that the market absorbs an additional 50 bcm volume growth
from 1985 to 1990 even though the price is above current level. Although there is presently
some growth in gas demand, this is far from the 10 bcm yearly predicted by the model. As a
mirror picture of the continued heavy investments in supply regions, gas continues to
penetrate the European market in the 1990s and reaches 273 bcm in 2000 (see the
appendix). Thereafter, there is no furhter expansion in consumption until gas from Troll II
enters the market after 2010. The results from this model simulations may be compared with
the scenarios for the gas market drawn in section 4. According to these, gas consumption
will show a growth somewhere between -5 and 21 percent until year 2000 (see table 4.1).
DOM, however, projects an increase in consumption of close to 50 percent in the same
period!
The explanation for the very strong consumption growth in the DOM model in the early
years of the simulation period is partly that we assume that end user prices will decrease
proportionally with cif-prices. In fact, as pointed out in section 5, the end user prices have
recently decreased less than proportionally, particularly in France and Germany. Another
factor restricting the observed demand may be presence and influence of short run price
elasticities, which are actually less (in absolute value) than those (long run elasticities)
actually applied in the model. This will, however, only represent a severe problem if there
are significant lag effects in gas demand (longer than 5 years).
Looking at the "test" indicators in the appendix, we observe positive NPI values all over,
showing that there are no signs of strategic investments in this model solution. Thus, all the
investments undertaken in the base run would also have been made at the same point in
time in a Cournot game. However, as we shall see below, by introducing other assumptions
for the exogenous variables, we get qualitatively different results.
High indigenous production. 5% discount rate. 
In this case, we assume that indigenous production will not decrease as assumed in the
base case, but rather increase to 150 bcm in 2000, and then stay constant at this level. This
may be more in line with the general growth in the market that will result from common
carriage, and also more in line with the scenario of Odell (1988). In addition, we have
lowered the discount rate from 10% to 5%. This will lower the opportunity cost of investing
and thus encourage strategic behaviour. The results from the new simulations are shown in
the appendix.
In this alternative, Soviet and Algeria each undertakes 2 investment projects in period 0.
This postpones Troll I one period (5 years), and Algerian LNG 10 years compared to the
base run. The price is below the base case price in all periods, and is only 44% of 1985
level in 1990 implying very low operating unit results that period. The test value of NPI is
negative, showing that the second Soviet investment is strategically motivated.
The strategic implications of this investment can be illustrated by simply not allowing the
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second Soviet investment in 1985. This will be observed by the other players, and they
compute their optimal investment plans given this information (according to their optimal
strategies). Below, the results from imposing this restriction is compared to the previous
unrestricted game.
Years of postponement of investments if Soviet postpones project 2 
Projects 	 1 	 2 	 3
Norway 	 •5 	 -15 	 •25
Atgeria 	 0 	 0 	 0
Soviet 	 0 	 25 	 0
In this case Norway turns out to be the agressive player, putting in all her projects in 1990.
The second Soviet project will be postponed for 25 years. This proves that the second
Soviet investment decision of 1985 in the previous solution was a strategic investment.
The Soviet postponement leads to a higher price in 1990, while the price is somewhat
lower in next two periods. Norway and in particular Algeria gain from the postponement,
while Soviet suffers a minor loss.
One period postponement. 
Another run was made to check the consequences of a one period postponement of
the complete game. This means that none of the investments are undertaken in the 1985-
1990 period, and the game starts in 1990. This may be interpreted to simulate more
accurately the 1992 deregulation of the EC market. The simualtion yields the same results as
in the case of Soviet postponement above. The only difference is that the price is higher in
1990 as a result of the fact that none of the 1985 investments are initiated.
Two periods postponement. 
In the final run, we postpone the game two periods and assume that Norway has
developed Sleipner and Troll I in 1995, i.e. according to the present contracts. This brings
us back to the same solution as in the no postponement case and price and flows are
identical from 2005 on. Discounted cash flows are higher for all players because prices are
higher in the period 1990-2000.
Sensitivity tests have been done to check the significance of some base case assumptions,
like price and income elasticities, oil price and costs. In general, the investment paths are
dependent on the development of the excess demand function of these parameters, but the
price path is affected less. The explanation is that an investment vil be initiated if the
market can absorb it at the relevant cost level. If the market is favourable (high demand)
more investments will be initiated, and vice versa. In addition to cost levels, the discount
rate is an important parameter determining the price path. If this parameter is unchanged,
the model will provide a relatively stable price projection, which in particular is not very
dependent on the oil price.
6.5.Summary of results. 
This section has investigated possible consequences of common carriage by simulating a
dynamic oligopoly model for the European gas market. We assume that the intermediate
barrier between suppliers and end users is done away with, and the players compete directly
for market shares. Clearly, a necessary condition for this assumption to hold is that a well
functioning regulatory body can be set up to ensure common carriage.
The opening of the market leads to a sharp fall in gas prices from 1985 levels, partly
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due to lower oil prices, but mainly due to utilization of excess capacity and heavy invest-
ments. The end user prices continue their downward trend from 1986 even though oil prices
are assumed to recover. This holds unless our cost estimates are on the lower side. In some
of the , model runs the dynamic game leads to strategic investments aimed to prevent other
players' investments.
The model describes an investment game assuming lumpiness on the supply side.
Lumpiness, however, is not a necessary condition for the existence of strategic investments
(Brekke et al (1987)).
The model is not designed for projecting the development of the European gas market in
any detail. But it demonstrates an important theoretical point, that oligopolistic competition
can lead to a fierce fight for market shares, even though there are a few players. If the
basic assumptions holds, that is: Common carriage prevails, the players cannot cooperate,
have information of prices and costs and heavy investments can be financed, there seems to
be little reason for worries about future supplies of natural gas to the European market if
the market is deregulated. The consumers would surely benefit from it, producers will
increase capacity utilization and gain market outlets for new investments, but compared to
the present state of the market, they may lose rents from selling high price gas to premium
markets when oil prices are high.
7. CONCLUSIONS.
The main purpose of this study have been to investigate possible effects of a deregulation of
the European gas market, that is: Introduction of the principle of common carriage or open
access to the European transmission and distribution system.
After a brief description of the European gas market, we have discussed the role of the
transmission companies in the light of static welfare economics. In the price/netback analysis
effects of a non profit pricing policy in transmission is compared with prevailing pricing
- policy. These calculations have revealed that, at least in some countries, transmission
companies have exploited monopoly power, and thus restricted gas consumption. Based on
these analysis, we conclude that the potential for natural gas is far from utilized, and that
due to increasing returns to scale, costs can be reduced by increasing volumes.
The game between suppliers in a deregulated environment is described by a dynamic
oligopoly model (DOM). The model runs indicate that there is no reason to worry about
future supplies of gas in the absence of long term "binding" supply contracts, provided that
the rules of the game are non-cooperative. The supply game leads to a battle for market
shares, and to a significant increase in total gas consumption in Europe. This occurs even
though there are only three supply regions, Norway, Algeria and Soviet Union. An
important element underlying the obtained results is the e xistence of strategic investments,
aimed to discourage other players' investments.
The study also surveys projections for the gas market given by leading institutions, based on
status quo assumptions, i.e. that prevailing barriers and institutional restrictions will continue.
These prospects vary between a 4 percent reduction and a 26.5 percent increase of gas
consumption up to 2010. The DOM-runs, assuming common carriage, predict a consumption
growth between 47.5% and 80%. This demonstrates that consumer will benefit from the
introduction of common carriage. Suppliers will gain new market outlets but may loose
shares of monopoly rents in existing contracts.
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APPENDIX: RESULTS FROM THE DOM SIMULATIONS. .
Closed loo
Base run
State	 Cap. Bcm	 Cons Price Market Shares	 Test
ear	 or Alg Sov Nor Alg Sov Bcm Norm Nor Alg Sov Nor Alg Sov
Int 	
........0...........0..........0:..13;0 ....17......28,6 ^ 	 ..183: .....1 ^^ :.. ^^^' .... x,10 ..0,16 .:. ...........................
1985E	 0	 1	 11 13,0 17,8 28,61 1831 1,00: 0,07 0,10 0,16
19901	 1	 2	 11 15,0 28,0 68,01 2331 0,601 0,06 0,12 0,29
19951	 2	 2	 11 16,0 46,0 68,01 2501 0,701 0,06 0,18 0,27
20001	 2	 2	 1iiii 40,0 46,0 68,0:	 273: 0,771 0,15 0,17 0,251
20051	 2	 2	 1 40,0 46,0 68,0	 271; 0,851 0,15 0,17 0,251
0101	 3	 2	 11 40,0 46,0 68,01 2701 0,931 0,15 0,17 0,251 +
015 .1	 3	 2	 21 64,0 46,0 68,01 2931 0,911 0,22 0,16 0,23
20204	 3	 2	 21 56,6 46,0 98,01 3141 0,901 0,18 0,15 0,31
20251	 3	 2	 21 55,8 46,0 98,01 3121 0,991 0,18 0,15 0,31
2030::::::	 3	 2	 2 53,0 46,0 98,01	 3081 1,11: 0,17 0,15 0,321
0351	 3	 2	 31 53,0 46,0 98,01 3061 1,221 0,17 0,15 0,321
20401	 3	 2	 31 53,0 46,0 128,01 3351 1,171 0,16 0,14 0,38
20451	 3	 3	 31 53,0 46,0.128,0:	 3341 1,29: 0,16 0,14 0,381	+
2050: 	 3 	 3 	 3 .1.  53,0 66,0128,0:	 3521 	 0,15 0,19 0,361
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Soviet Dostnonement
High indogenous production. 5% discount rate
State	 Cap. Bcm	 Cons Price	 Market Shares	 Test















The game initialized în1990
High indogenous production. 5% discount rate
State	 Cap. Bcm	 Cons Price	 Market Shares	 Test
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